Shareholders\u27 Liability for Dividends Improperly Declared and Paid by Witz, David A.
SMU Law Review
Volume 1 | Issue 2 Article 6
1947
Shareholders' Liability for Dividends Improperly
Declared and Paid
David A. Witz
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
David A. Witz, Shareholders' Liability for Dividends Improperly Declared and Paid, 1 Sw L.J. 220 (1947)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol1/iss2/6
TEXAS LAW AND LEGISLATION
SHAREHOLDERS' LIABILITY FOR DIVIDENDS
IMPROPERLY DECLARED AND PAID
A LTHOUGH the conduct of corporations is governed to a con-
siderable extent by statute in practically every state, this fact
does not render inappropriate at least cursory consideration of
the common-law background of even those aspects of corporate
finance which have received legislative consideration. As both
the common-law and history play in this connection at least an
interstitial role on the legal stage of today, these will provide a
point of departure for a consideration of certain problems arising
out of the act of a corporation in paying an illegal dividend to its
shareholders, the amount of which creditors subsequently attempt
to recover.
Just as according to almost any notion of substantial justice
the aggrieved creditors would seem entitled to recover, so pro-
vision therefor was made in the earliest English charters to the
effect that liability should fall on the shareholders.' However, a
search for a body of early common-law precedents on the point
would be in vain, for the earliest cases involving dividends did
not litigate the actual validity of their declaration but rather
were suits between parties each claiming the dividends."
The path which this particular phase of dividend law was to
follow in the American jurisdictions was hewed largely by his-
torical accident. In this country the special charter and general
incorporation acts have been the principal device for regulation
of such corporate acts rather than a large volume of case law.
Personal liability for illegal dividends was imposed on the direc-
tors so declaring, rather than on the shareholders receivingz, in
I Amendments to Charter of Bank of England, 8 and 9 WM. AND M., 1697, c. 20; Act
authorizing charter of English Linen Company, 4 GEo. I, 1764, c. 37.
2 Johnqon v. East India Co., Finch Ch. 430 (Ch. 1679) ; Gardner v. Pullen & Phillips,
2 Vern. 394 (Ch. 1700).
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the first American charters' and in the basic New York Act of
1825, which in turn were patterned after a clause imposing such
liability in the first charter of the Bank of the United States.'
This latter clause had itself been taken from the 1694 Act author-
izing the Crown to charter the Bank of England;' but in the copy-
.ing, Alexander Hamilton, by substituting directors' liability for
that of the shareholders, shifted statutory liability from the share-
holder to the directors who declared the dividend However, this
approach has been eroded by considerations of business ex-
pediency so that now the shareholder is also responsible for
illegal dividends, a responsibility determined by a group of
factors often vague and uncertain.'
The initial inquiry in any attempt to evaluate the wisdom of
such a result must be as to the source of an improper dividend.
Ordinarily it is said to be one declared out of capital stock, mean-
ing by the latter term the assets contributed by shareholders which
afford the basis for credit advanced by the creditors. Ballantine'
prefers to call this fund "lena. capital" and describes it as a
"certain level marked by a gauge uip.n the corporate reservoir of
assets. If the assets stamid above that level, they may be drawn off
for the shareholder. If the assets fall below that level, the re-
maining supply must be reserved for business purposes and for
the creditors. Capital is 'impaired' . . . if: the value of the assets
falls below the amount of the liabilities plus the amount of the
legal capital. No dividend may lawfully be paid unless after such
payment the value of the property of the corporation .. . is equal
to the aggregate of its liabilities and the legal capital."
3 N. J. Acts 1803, c. 109 (Newark Banking & Ins. Co.) ; Pa. Acts 1804, c. 51 (Phila-
'lelphia Bank).
4 1 STAT. 191 (1789) (making directors responsible for incurring corporation debts
in excess of the bank's capital).
5 5 and 6 WNt. AND M. 1692, c. 20.
6 KEHL. CORPORATE DIVIDENDS (1941) c. 1.
Coor, CORPORAMTONS (8th ed. 1923) § 548.
Ballantine and Hills, Corporate Capital and Dividend Restrictions (1935) 23 CALIF.
L. REv. 229.
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For whose benefit are these directions against depletion of cap.
ital, capital stock, or legal capital, as the fund is variously desig-
nated? According to one view, the fund is for the benefit of the
shareholders; under this view there can be a recovery of dividends
only when the corporation is actually insolvent at the time of
payment. The other view, of course, is that the fund is for the
protection of creditors; by this approach a recovery is always
permitted when the payment of a dividend impairs capital. But
under either view the contested dividend must have been actually
illegal before recovery is permitted; that it was merely ill-advised
in the light of subsequent events as a declaration by prodigal
directors will not support an action forcing the shareholder to
disgorge.
THEORIES OF LIABILITY
Trust Fund Theory. The anachronistic citadel upon which share-
holder liability has been predicated has been the trust fund
theory. Its thesis is that the capital of a corporation is a fund
pledged for the payment of its debts. Each person who gives credit
to the corporation does so with the confidence that the fund exists
for his protection and security against loss. The shareholders are
deemed to be conclusively charged with notice of the trust char-
acter which attaches to the capital stock. As to it, they cannot
occupy the status of innocent purchasers; and when they have in
their hands any of this fund, they hold it cure onere, subject to
all equities which attach to it. This may savor of a creditor's idea
of equity, but it is not sound law.
The Supreme Court of the United States, as well as most of
the highest state courts, has had occasion to consider and to deny
the soundness of this doctrine! Such a result has not been surpris-
ing since only the statement of the doctrine is required to manifest
9 Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U. S. 371 (1893) (overruling Wood v.
Dummer, 3 Mason C. C. R. 309 (1824), and declaring that the property of corporations
was as fully within their control as that of an individual and could only be converted into
a trust fund by actual insolvency).
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its incongruity; the term itself is a misnomer as there is neither
trustee nor a cestui que trust in the strict sense."0
In spite of the lack of sound basis for the trust fund theory,
and notwithstanding its cogent repudiation, the courts continue to
refer to it in judicial opinions as a vital and controlling doctrine."1
Nor have the Texas courts been free from this error, even though
the theory is not essential to the decision reached and the result
could have been predicated on firmer ground. Thus the practice of
courts refusing to traffic in fresh ideas when they have decided
to protect a creditor of a corporation has been to brand the source
of the dividend payment a "trust" which ipso facto may be recov-
ered from one who is a mere donee and into whose hands the
property may be traced. The Maryland court has based the
right of recovery on the ground that money paid after insolvency
is taken from a fund held in trust for creditors." But the tyranny
of labels should not lead to such a conclusion.
Fraudulent Conveyance Theory. The theory most generally seen
in recent opinions is that of a fraudulent conveyance. Since a
dividend indicates that a corporation is prosperous, it is fraud
to pay such from capital stock and thus equity will demand a
return. A distribution of assets leaving corporate creditors unpaid
is a fraud upon subsisting creditors. This view has been extended
to the point of holding the shareholders themselves responsible
on the theory that when they invested in the corporation and se-
lected the officers, they thereby guaranteed compliance with the
law so that they are equally responsible with directors for fraudu-
lent impairment of capital, especially when they have profited to
the extent of the impairment."
10 See Hunt, The Trust Fund Theory (1902) 12 YALE L. J. 63; (1908) 8 COL. L. REV.
303; (1916) 4 VA. L. REV. 131.
I1 STEVENS, CORPORATIONS (1936) 403.
12 Arnold v. Knapp, 75 W. Va. 804,84 S. E. 895 (1915).
13 Bartlett v. Smith, 162 Md. 478, 160 Atl. 440, 161 At. 509 (1932). See Barrows,
The Equitable Liability of Stockholders (1903) 13 YALE L. J. 66.
14 See 81 CENT. L J. 227 (1915) ; see Cottrell v. Albany Mfg. Co., 142 App. Div. 148,
126 N. Y. Supp. 1070 (1911).
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Reference should be made in this connection to the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act. A literal interpretation of Section 5
of the Act" might well be relied upon by the creditors, even
though the corporation was solvent at the time of payment. Yet
there seems to be no case in which the plaintiff has taken advan-
tage of this possibility.'" However, in at least one case in Massa-
chusetts," recovery was allowed of a dividend paid when the
corporation was insolvent, the court saying that any doubt as to
the right to recover dividends paid by an insolvent corporation
had been removed by the enactment of the Uniform Act. Even as
an original question it would seem that a corporation should be
subject to the same restrictions against fraudulent conveyances
of its property as an individual. Perhaps the argument may be
made thus: when an insolvent man is suddenly influenced by a
transient feeling of gratitude and becomes generous with his
assets, the resulting conveyance is fraudulent as a matter of law,
and the donee must surrender. Simply because the debtor hap-
pens to be a corporation to whom a few more devices are avail-
able, it should not be allowed to make fraudulent conveyances.
Furthermore, it is a reasonable assumption that the provisions in
the various corporation acts are intended to be additional safe-
guards and are not effective to suspend restrictions which exist
as to all other persons.'" Certainly if the corporation is insolvent
and pays an illegal dividend to its shareholders, the theory of
fraudulent conveyance is a sufficient basis for the suit." Many
states have general fraudulent conveyance statutes prohibiting the
transfer of property by insolvent debtors. And in several of the
15 The provision of the Act is as follows: "Every conveyance made without fair con-
sideration when the person making it is engaged ... in a business or transaction for
which the property remaining in his hands after the conveyance is an unreasonably small
capital, is fraudulent as to creditors ..
18 Weiner, Theory of Anglo.American Dividend Law (1929) 29 COL. L. Rev. 462.
17 Powers v. Heggie, 268 Mass. 233, 167 N. E. 314 (1929).
1s Kun. note 6 supra.
15 See (1933) 33 COL. L REv. 481.
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leading corporation states, the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act has been adopted.""
Calling an improper dividend a fraudulent conveyance has an
appeal to the complacent, but it is not an answer to the issues
actually presented. Ingenious criticism has been directed at this
theory."' In the first place the shareholder is not a naked donee
as is the usual conveyee in a fraudulent transfer, for the simple
reason that he has made an investment in the enterprise. Further-
more, once the corporation declares a dividend, such declaration
assumes the status of a debt to the shareholder and becomes due
and payable as such. Were this merely a promise of a gift, no
such result would follow.
Statutory Liability. A third basis for shareholder liability is
provided in statutory regulation. Statutes exist in most states
forbidding payment-of dividends out of capital. In some states the
limitation is express, but in any state it is difficult to assert a con-
struction that denies the implication in the statutes against im-
proper payment of dividends. Thus a third ground is available for
holding that any such payment is illegal and may be set aside by
any interested party. A shareholder profiting by such action must
give up what he has illegally received.
The strictest type of statute is that which imposes liability under
any circumstances so long as the shareholder has received a
dividend paid out of funds other than profit or surplus -' and
makes the shareholder liable to any creditor for the amount of
capital refunded to him." Within this category of strict provisions
should also be included those statutes which make the shareholder
liable not only to the creditors, but also to the directors who have
20DE3 REv. CODE (1935) H 6059-6070: MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 39B;
MAss. LAws ANN. (1932), c. 109A, §§ 1-12; MICH. STAT. ANN. (1936) §§ 26.881-26.894;
MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) H 8475-8489; N. J. REV. STAT. (1937) § 25:2-7, 25:2-19;
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) H 351-63.
21 See 2 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (rev. ed. 1940) 1 604.
2
2R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923), c. 248, § 38.
23 MicH. Coan'. LAWS (1929),I 10018.
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incurred loss for the wrongful declaration."' Maine requires a
judgment against the corporation as a condition precedent to
recovery against the shareholder." A provision of the strict type
is found in the Uniform Business Corporation Act, Section 25.2
The element of scienter is characteristic of another general
classification of the statutes regulating shareholder liability. This
type of statute adds the word "knowledge," thus making good or
bad faith the decisive factor in the controversy. The California
statute, for example, provides that "any stockholder ... who re-
ceives any dividend not authorized ... with knowledge of facts in-
dicating the impropriety thereof shall be liable ... for the amount
so received.... 2 In interpreting this statute the California court
has held that "dividend not authorized" covers any division of
profits or capital of a corporation not made in accordance with
the corporation law of the state and included distribution of cap-
ital between stockholders who informally agreed thereto.2 ' How-
ever, Ohio, while making bad faith a condition precedent, limits
liability "to the corporation."2'
It was long contended in those jurisdictions making the directors
liable by statute that had the legislature intended to make the
shareholders liable, it would have specifically referred to them.
But the courts have indicated that shareholder liability exists
irrespective of the statute;3 0 that the statute does not transfer lia-
bility from the shareholder to the directors, but creates a cumula-
24 W. VA. CODE ANN. (Barnes, 1923) c. 31, art. 1.
25 ME. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 56, § 102. See VT. GEN. LAws (1917) § 4940; WIs. STAT.
(1929) 1 182.19.
26 The section reads: "Every stockholder who received any such dividend ... shall in
the following instances be... liable to the corporation... (a) when no director is liable
to the corporation .. ., or (b) to the extent that the corporation is unable to obtain satis-
faction after judgments recovered against directors .
27 CALIF. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 364.
28 Oilwell Chemical & Materials Co. v. Petroleum Supply Co., 64 Cal. App. 367, 148 P
(2d) 720 (1944).
2 9OIo GEN. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 364; see Idaho Laws 1929, c. 262, p. 561; La.
Laws 1928, Act 250, p. 27.
30 Bottlers Seal Co. v. Rainey, 243 N. Y. 333, 153 N. E. 437 (1926).
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tive liability in favor of the corporation and creditors." This ghost
seems to have been laid by the decisions of those courts in whose
jurisdiction the shareholders are specifically mentioned by statute
when they say the same result would have been forthcoming ir-
respective of the statute.
To what extent has the creditor received protection? Once
liquidation has begun, the liquidator of course represents all
creditors; but even if there is no liquidatioh in progress, a judg-
ment creditor of a corporation may sue the shareholders in equity.
In this type of suit the creditor may act for himself and need not
champion a representative suit."' And the Supreme Court of
Maryland held that the judgment creditor need not sue in equity,
but can maintain a quasi-contractual action for money had and
received."
Misrepresentation of Fact. A theory akin to fraudulent convey-
ance, but not squarely within its purview, is that of misrepresenta-
tion of fact. The distinction is discernible but not obvious. Corpo-
rations operate by means of their capital fund. Thus a misrepre-
sentation of fact occurs when this fund is represented to be greater
than it really is. Therefore for a debtor corporation to appear to
be in command of greater resources than are actually at its dis-
posal is misleading. The basis for recovery here is that credit was
extended in reliance on a misrepresentation. Of course the creditor
must show credit was extended prior to termination of the mis-
leading appearance of greater resources. Any actual knowledge
will preclude recovery.""
Mistake. A final theory which should at least be adverted to is
that of mistake. Although this theory has never enjoyed wide
acceptance, recovery has been permitted in Kentucky on the
grounds that a payment of dividends made under mistake should
"1 Williams v. Boice, 38 N. J. Eq. 364 (1884).
"Hatch v. Dana, 101 U. S. 205 (1879).
33 GLINN, note 21 supra.
"4 (1938) 47 YALE L J. 1164.
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in good conscience be repaid.' : A later case in the same jurisdic-
tion was decided on the ground of "mutual mistake" between
corporation and shareholders which was held not to have been
ratified by receipt of an illegal dividend declared by the direc-
tors."' This idea apparently has only been mentioned in passing
in other cases."
EFFECT OF INSOLVENCY OF THE CORPORATION
Two factors must now be considered which are operative in
every controversy over illegal dividends: first, the financial status,
of the corporation, i.e., whether it is solvent or insolvent; second,
the faith of the shareholder, whether good or bad. To recognize
these considerations is obviously to weigh the conflicting interests
of shareholder and creditor, and the solution will lie, if solution
there be, in an arena in which these two economic policies coin-
pete for supremacy.
Needless to say, there is more than one method of appraising
a corporation's financial standing to determine insolvency. The
two basic tests which have ordinarily been employed have been
the equity test of ability to meet obligations as they mature and
the bankruptcy test of excess of assets over liabilities, exclusive
of capital. Generally, statutory provisions are applicable and
determine the test to be applied.
When the corporation is solvent, both at the time of payment of
the dividend and at the time of suit, there is conflict as to the
liability of the shareholder for receipt of an improper dividend.
The rule applied by most of the states"8 is that a shareholder who
in good faith receives illegal dividends from a solvent corpora-
tion cannot be held liable to refund them even though they are
paid out of capital stock. This view of course is a logical exten-
s5 Gratz v. Redd, 4 B. Mon. 178 (Ky. 1843).
36 Lexington L. F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Page & Richardson, 17 B. Mon. 412 (Ky. 1856).
s Salina Mercantile Co. v. Stiefel, 82 Kan. 7, 107 Pac. 774 (1910) ; Lords Equity
Exchange v. Jones, 42 N. D. 145, 145 N. W. 863 (1919).
$9 Carlisle v. Ottley, 143 Go. 797,85 S. E. 1010 (1915).
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sion of the view which rejects the trust fund doctrine, the idea
being that there is no lien of creditors upon a solvent concern.
Instead, this result is based on the principle that a corporation,
while solvent and a going concern, holds its property, as does an
individual, free from the control of its general creditors and may
dispose of it as it deems best, subject to the provisions of its
charter and those other restraints'upon the conveyance of prop-
erty which the law imposes alike upon corporation and individual.
In a number of states shareholders are held liable to refund
dividends illegally paid even though the corporation was solvent
at the time of payment and at the time of suit. Nor does it matter
according to this view that the shareholder may have received the
dividend in ignorance of the true state of affairs."' Under this
view the payment of dividends from capital is in all cases a vol-
untary disposition of assets which impairs the capital and is for-
bidden as a fraud on creditors, or as a dissipation of the trust
fund, or as misappropriation of a fund pledged for the payment
of debts; the courts hold that the fund may be followed into the
hands of shareholders who are not to be considered bona fide
purchasers. Such theories are of out-dated concern. For surely it
is fallacious to say that a creditor is injured by a payment of
dividends made out of capital so long as assets enough are left
to pay all the debts. The doctrine laid down in McDonald v.
Williams ° and in the cases which follow it" seems to be an excep-
tion to the general principle of the law of restitution that a non-
tortious taker of property which it would have been wrongful to
take had he known the facts, is under a duty to account, provided
no value has been paid."2 There is no paucity of doctrines avail-
able for proceeding against the innocent shareholder and his
89 Mackall v. Pocock, 136 Minn. 8, 161 N. W. 228 (1917).
40 McDonald v. Williams, 174 U. S. 397 (1898).
41 Burton v. Roos, 20 F. Supp. 75 (S. D. Tex. 1937) (ordinarily a stockholder is not
liable for the debts of his company because of a dividend declared and paid to him, nor
required to pay back a dividend paid to him where the dividend is providently and in
good faith declared and paid).
2 REsTAT E.NT, RESTITUTION (1936) 1 123.
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dividend impecuniously born. Why then do many courts refuse to
do so? Perhaps it is because of a seeming tendency to lessen
emphasis upon protection to the creditor. When the corporation
was a new form of organization, insolvency often came quickly.
Safeguards for the creditor were necessary. However, there is
reason to believe that this concern is somewhat less important to
the courts now that state statutes everywhere control the activities
of corporations, the Securities and Exchange Commission has
become a silent director, and economic responsibility has become
a fait accompli.
On the other hand it is clear that dividends paid out of capital
at a time when the corporation was insolvent may be recovered
back. 3 For when actual insolvency arises, the creditor can surely
claim injury, and the dividend is recoverable from all sharehold-
ers, innocent and guilty. In many states, statutes provide that in-
solvency dividends shall not be paid. The statutory prototype of
some modern enactments appeared first in the manufacturing
corporation regulation act adopted by Massachusetts in 1830."'
In a large number of states the insolvency restriction is de-
scended from the original Massachusetts law through the New
York Manufacturing Act of 1848, which contained a provision
making directors liable for improper dividends." Thus was created
the anomalous hybrid of the Massachusetts insolvency rule and
the New York capital impairment doctrine. And this laid a pat-
tern which was widely copied and is still in force in several
states. 6
Iowa has the double insolvency-capital impairment restric-
tion of the New York Act of 1848, but in addition a peculiar
clause making shareholders liable to persons sustaining damage
43 Hayden v. Thompson, 17 C. C. A. 592, 71 Fed. 60 (C. C. A. 8th, 1895).
" Mass. Laws (Jan. Laws 1830) c. 53, § 9.
43 N. Y. Laws 1848, c. 40, § 13.
46 COLO. STAT. ANN. (1935) c. 41, § 34; MD. ANN. CODE (1935 Supp.) Art. 23, § 87;




from dividends which leave insufficient assets to meet the corpo-
rate liabilities."
Language similar to the early Massachusetts and New York
Acts has been carried over into many of the modem corporation
insolvency provisions. Thus the Illinois Business Corporation Act
provides that no dividend shall be paid when the corporation is
insolvent or its net assets are less than its stated capital, or when
payment of the dividend would produce that effect.""
The California Act prohibits dividends when the corporation is
insolvent either in the equity or the bankruptcy sense.' And if
there is reasonable ground for believing that the corporation is un-
able to satisfy its obligations and liabilities, Ohio does not permit
dividends to be paid."0
In the majority of states, no specific corporation act provision
prohibits a corporation from paying dividends when insolvent. It
is important to inquire in these states as to the existence of either
general statutory provisions or a common-law doctrine which
might render such dividend illegal."
Of course the third situation is where the corporation was sol-
vent at the time dividends were paid, but is insolvent at the time
of suit. Again there is conflict as to the right to recover against
the receiving shareholder. The answer here depends to some ex-
tent upon the view taken by the courts as to the trust fund theory.
For recourse against a shareholder is not precluded by the fact
that a creditor's demand originates after the dividends have been
paid, and if he relies on the capital being as represented, he is
entitled to compel a refund." This is held to follow from the trust
fund theory which is said to apply with equal force to future as
well as present creditors. So under this rule dividends paid while
47 IOWA CODE (1939) § 8377-8.
48 32 ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) § 157.41.
49 CAL. Crv. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 346.
30 Omo CODE ArN. (Baldwin, 1938) § 8623-38.
51 See KrL, note 6 supra.
52 Mackall v. Pocock, 136 Minn. 8, 161 N. W. 228 (1917).
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a corporation is insolvent may be recovered by subsequent
creditors.
The other view is that creditors whose claims accrue subse-
quent to the wrongful payment have no equity in the diverted
assets superior to that of the shareholder who received the pay-
ment in good faith and cannot recover." This rule is followed
even in cases involving such a dividend paid at a time when the
corporation was insolvent or was rendered so by the payment.
EFFECT OF SHAREHOLDER'S GOOD FAITH
Every analysis of receipt of improper dividends involves the
inquiry: What was the faith of the shareholder-good or bad-
in receiving such dividend? The authorities are uncomfortably
unpredictable as to the effect of good faith. The distinction is of
course immaterial when statutory liability is absolute.'
The view which holds shareholders liable for dividends paid
to them out of capital even though they acted in good faith and
without knowledge that the dividend was actually illegal makes
a reliance on trust terms. And the incorporation of this view into
statutes has been accomplished in those jurisdictions whose laws 5
recite that there is liability under any circumstance for receipt
of an improper dividend."
However the United States Supreme Court has held that the
receiver of a national bank cannot recover back a dividend de-
clared and paid out of capital at a time when the bank was solvent
and the shareholder acted in good faith."' This then is the con-
trary view which was adopted by the federal courts and applied
by them to other types of corporations. And this view was seem-
ingly the animating principle for those state statutes which make
53 Montgomery v. Whitehead, 40 Colo. 320,90 Pac. 509 (1907).
54 See -12 FLF .Tm, CYCLOPrEDA OF CORPORATIONS (penn. ed. 1931) § 5422 et seq.
55 MicH. Comp. LAws (1929) § 10018 (stockholder is liable to any creditor for the
amount of capital stock refunded to him). See First National Bank v. Heller Sawdust Co.,
240 Mich. 688, 216 N. W. 464 (1927).
56 In re Bay Ridge Inn, 98 F. (2d) 85 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
57 McDonald v. Williams, 174 U. S. 397 (1898).
[Vol. I
SHAREHOLDERS' LIABILITY
the good or bad faith of the shareholder the crucial point by add-
ing the word "knowingly" to the statute."
An honest approach to this entire problem requires considera-
tion of both the shareholder and the creditor. Both have contrib-
uted to the corporate assets but with different incentives. The
view favoring priority of creditors is based on the concept that
reliance is made on the stated capitalization to guarantee repay-
ment of the loan. Thus the creditor suffers a defeat of his normal
expectation when the shareholder receives a return to which he
is not legally entitled and which might impair the security of the
creditor's loan.
Shareholders make their contributions in expectation of a
share of the profits from the enterprise, or a right to participate
in the assets of the corporation upon dissolution. Their rights can
rise no higher than those of the corporation and the shareholder
is married to its fate. Harsh is the view which would demand con-
tribution from an innocent shareholder receiving his dividend in
ignorance of its unlawful payment. The situation was expressed
with a good deal of accuracy by the Maryland court in Bartlett v.
Smith:
"In these days stocks of corporations are so widely held that it would
be practically impossible for stockholders generally to know whether
each . . . dividend . . . was earned. Whatever their position may be
theoretically, practically they are in no better position than creditors to
know the condition of the company, and it would be an unfair and un-
reasonable burden to require them to pay back, years after they have
been spent, dividends received in good faith from a solvent corporation
in regular course of business.""
Some of the appeal of this argument would be sapped by the
statute of limitations requirement" of prompt action by the
58CALIF. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1931) §364; OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1931) § 8623-
123b. See Chisnell v. Ozier Co., 140 Ohio St. 355, 44 N. E. (2d) 464 (1942).
-5 Bartlett v. Smith, 162 Md. 478, 160 Atl. 440, 161 Atl. 509 (1932).
60 Uniform Business Corporation Act, § 25, requires that "no action shall be brought
against a ... stockholder... unless brought within two years from the date on which such
payment ... was made...."
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creditors. Nor would it involve a grudging concession to common
sense to say that the shareholder's visa does not entitle him en-
trance to the sanctum of control, and his only source of informa-
tion comes from the corporation officers. The chrysallis of a divi-
dend, then, being a resolution stating that it is properly declared,
should a shareholder be disturbed who accepts that dividend in
the belief that the resolution states the truth?
In the abstract, these considerations seem too remote and shadowy
to shape the course of justice. But it may well be indulging in a
cruel fiction to require restitution from a shareholder who had not
even that kind of notice required before a purchaser is compelled
to submit to an outstanding equity. True the shareholder is not
technically a purchaser, but morally there seems slight justifica-
tion for extending the net of either statute or common-law liabil-
ity beyond the equitable limits that protect the purchaser of ordi-
nary assets.
Where a shareholder has notice, the considerations are ob-
viously different and justice demands a return. Why should he
be permitted this unjust enrichment arising from a clear violation
of statute? Good faith is missing on the part of a shareholder
who has reason to believe payment was made from a source other
than that properly designated for dividends. The distinction was
considered by Judge Learned Hand who indicated that while a
shareholder in good faith was merely an innocent participant, one
in bad faith was an accomplice to its commission.
Once a duty to return the dividend is found, it will not avail
the shareholder that the shareholders themselves authorized the
directors to make the payment;"' nor that the credit was made on
the stock subscription rather than cash;" nor that the return was
illegal and therefore void ;"' nor that a statutory right of recovery
is available against the directors;" nor that he has transferred the
61 Lexington L. F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Page & Richardson, 17 B. Mon. 412 (Ky. 1856).
62 Edwards v. Schillinger, 245 111. 231, 91 N. E. 1048 (1910).
" Tennant v. Epstein, 356 IlL 26, 189 N. E. 864 (1934).
" Bartlett v. Smith, 162 Md. 478,160 AtL 440,161 AtL 509 (1932).
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stock to another;" nor that the corporation acted in good faith in
paying the dividend."
And suit may be maintained by the corporation or corporation
creditors," receivers,"8 or trustees in bankruptcy." Where cap-
ital stock is depleted by the payment of unearned dividends to
one class of shareholders, to the injury of another class, any one
of the latter class may compel the corporation itself to recover
the funds so unlawfully withdrawn."
TExAS LAW
Apparently unable to avoid use of the alluring phrase "trust
fund" the Texas Supreme Court has often decided that the capital
assets of a corporation constitute a trust fund, but only when there
is insolvency plus a quitting of business.'1 And this has been held
despite the fact that in dealing with creditors' rights generally, the
Texas courts follow the fraudulent conveyance doctrine.' As a
result of this adherence to the remnant of a theory now coming
generally to be abandoned, the cases permit a shareholder to re-
tain dividends, the payment of which rendered the company insol-
vent, merely because in Texas the assets of a company do not
become a trust fund until the insolvent company ceases to do
business.
Since statutory basis exists for the protection of creditors,'" it
is not difficult to conclude that the courts could well abandon
reference to the nebulous trust fund doctrine both as being un-
necessary to the decision reached and as a doctrine pregnant with
future controversy.
85 Hurlbut v. Tayler, 62 Wis. 607, 22 N. W. 855 (1885).
8 Detroit Trust Co. v. Goodrich, 175 Mich. 168, 141 N. W. 882 (1913).
87 Powers v. Heggie, 268 Mass. 233, 167 N. E. 314 (1929).
8 Detroit Trust Co. v. Goodrich, 175 Mich. 168, 141 N. W. 882 (1913).
69 Ulness v. Dunnell, 61 N. D. 95, 237 N. W. 208 (1931).
TO Detroit Trust Co. v. Goodrich, 175 Mich. 168, 141 N. W. 882 (1913).
71 Lyons-Thomas Hdw. Co. v. Perry Stove Mfg. Co., 86 Tex. 143, 24 S. W. 16 (1893).
12 Mathis v. Pridham, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 58, 20 S. W. 1015 (1892).
13 TEx. PrN. CODE (Vernon, 1925) art. 1033a; TEx. Ray. Crv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925)
arts. 594, 1329, 1347.
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Dean Hildebrand espoused the cause of the creditors to the
exclusion of any interest of the shareholders.' It is his opinion
that in order to afford creditors "necessary protection," recovery
should lie against even an innocent shareholder who may have
changed his position after receiving the dividend, inasmuch as the
dividend was paid him by "mistake" and as "he has paid nothing
for it." However, he does concede that the Texas trust fund doc-
trine is "so much opposed to reason and the authorities that it
should not be followed."
CONCLUSION
It is the writer's opinion that legislation should be enacted to
afford an additional safeguard to creditors of corporations beyond
those provided by law for the creditors of individuals. During the
early period of American legal history, there were no safeguards
provided by law for the protection of creditors." Nor has there
been any single pattern for those that have since come into being
including varying theories of common-law liability and equally
variant types of statutes. If it is uniformity that is desired, a more
unworthy genesis can hardly be imagined. There is nothing except
the numbing effect of precedent to prevent the courts from relax-
ing what is often a mere doctrinaire adherence to these varying
theories.
An example of authoritative force and illustrative value is that
of statutory regulation of public utility companies. Section 12 (c)
of the Public Utilities Holding Companies Act"' briefly stated pro-
vides that it shall be unlawful for any company to declare or pay
any dividend in contravention of such rules as the Commission
deems necessary to protect the financial integrity of companies, to
safeguard the working capital, and to prevent the payment of
dividends out of capital or unearned surplus. This wording seems
fully capable of providing protection to creditors and sharehold-
1
' See HILDEuDAND, TExAS CORPORATIONS (1942) § 491.
1s WAREN., Safeguarding the Creditors ot Corporations (1923) 36 HARv. L REY. 509.
T 49 ST'AT. 823 (935), 15 U.S. C.A. §791 (1940). See (1940) 49 Y*u L J. 492.
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ers alike. A standard is provided for determination of capital
impairment and a basis exists for protecting investors against
improper withdrawals, whether they be shareholders or creditors.
David A. Witz.
